In
This Issue |
1. How the Federal Courts Got
Their Inefficiency. Your Editor starts
a parlous journey.
2. Did You
Know. More recognition for SG
lawyers.
3. ALI Tables Vote on
Aggregate Settlement Rules. Supermajority proposal provokes backlash.
4. Don't Try This at
Work. A marketer proposes price-fixing
by lawyers.
5. Banishing Jury Trial --
Update. The stats don't look
good.
6. Cartoon. Would that you could.
7. Hot Lunch. Epistemology of "meritless" lawsuits.
8. Links &
Info.
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Don't Try this at Work.
Your Editor recently got an email about lawyer
marketing. It included an article that promised
help on getting "'top dollar' for your work", avoiding
"under pricing yourself", and overcoming the fear of
"rais[ing] your fees".
Hmmm. But as I skimmed down the html page,
alarm bells started going off. For under the
rubric of "The Market Method of Pricing", the author
offered these suggestions (with bold emphasis mine):
[The market method] is a good way of determining
pricing. Get your assistant to support you in this task
and spend time discovering what the range of pricing is
in the community.
Have your assistant
do a "mystery shopper" study by calling around as if
he/she were a potential client. Find out what your
competitors say on the phone around pricing. Your
assistant may need to call from his/her home phone to
avoid caller ID. As another option, you could have
him/her call other legal assistants or
paralegals at your competitors' firms and offer to
exchange your fees for their fees -- or you could do
that yourself with other lawyers in your
market.
If you really want to get into
it and have maximum data, write to a few dozen
competitors in your market-place and say you are doing a
fee survey. Explain that if they would send you
their fee list, you will create a composite list
that does not identify those responding and send them a
copy of the results. To keep it simple for
them, include a stamped, self-addressed envelope with a
list of the most common services offered in your
practice area.
Remember that in general it is not a good practice strategy to compete on
price. Most potential clients will see pricing
that is too low as a signal that there is something
missing either from the service, the provider, or the
firm. And people who are looking for a low price will
follow that low price wherever they can find it rather
than becoming long-term clients. So be sure that your
price covers your costs and a reasonable profit
margin.
I doubt the marketing guru intended
any-thing untoward. And unless the surveying
activity results in an agreement among competitors to
fix, maintain, or stabilize prices, nothing illegal may
have happened. But systematically collecting and
sharing competitors' pricing data can lead to just such
a thing.
Which section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids.
And we wouldn't want that. |

Hot Lunch.
Your Editor hears and reads a lot about meritless lawsuits. I wonder what the
speakers and writers mean by that.
The word can't signify only that the lawsuit-bringer
loses. Tons of stuff can bring defeat: Lack
of jurisdiction, suing too late, suing too early,
sanctions for discovery abuse, failure to meet
deadlines, estoppel, issue and claim preclusion, volenti non fit injuria, running out of money for
fees and expenses, and a thousand other shocks that
claims are heir to.
Nor does meritless imply a trouncing on the
merits. We have gobs of procedural hurdles that
aim to balance our desire to correct wrongdoing against
the risk of collateral consequences. Fraud
pleadings thus must allege deceit with particularity;
after Twombly's horror of discovery, averments must (sometimes) meet a (vague)
plausibility test; and certain types of claims have to
satisfy a clear and convincing standard of proof.
So what does meritless mean. Probably
just this: that the lawsuit, or its handling,
failed any of the multivarious challenges that our
system puts in its way.
A random day in May reminded me of how
seldom a jury, instead of a judge, passes judgment on
whether the lawsuit has merit . The 13
federal courts of appeals published eight opinions in
regular civil cases. One reversed denial of a
motion to vacate a default judgment; another overturned
a refusal to allow intervention; three upheld summary
judgments; one affirmed a dismissal for failure to state
a claim; and one okayed a judgment on the pleadings.
The eighth case went to trial. A jury rendered
a verdict. The district court entered judgment on
it. But then the court of appeals reversed and
remanded for entry of judgment contrary to the
verdict.
I guess that one was meritless,
too. |
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How the Federal Courts Got
Their Inefficiency.
Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936).
Kipling's Just So Stories (1902)
include the marvelous one about "The Elephant's
Child". It tells how the elephant got its
trunk.
In what manner did he obtain it. Kipling
tells us that, because of Elephant Child's "'satiable
curiosity", he wanted to know what Crocodile eats for
dinner. Questing for and then finding the object
of his interest, he believes Crocodile's promise to
whisper the answer and leans close to hear.
But Crocodile means to devour him and so
clamps toothy jaws on Elephant Child's diminutive
proboscis. Elephant Child tries to pull away, and
soon his friend the Bi-Coloured-Python-Rock-Snake coils
around his back legs and commences a-pulling too.
The double-teaming works, separating Elephant Child from
hungry Crocodile, but not before stretching the
pachydermous pug to five feet and more.
If we stop here, we would think that Kipling intended
a cautionary tale about nosiness. But the author
of The Jungle Book, If--, and Kim meant no such thing. His tale instead goes on to
demonstrate how useful the accidental product of
'satiable curiosity became to Elephant Child and his
posterity.
"That may all seem well and good to you, Mr. Editor,"
we hear you say, "but what does that have to do with the
judiciary and its acquisition of inefficiency.
Please, good sir, do get to the point. And do it
efficiently, mind!"
We shall endeavor to start doing so now.
In 1905 -- his "miracle year" -- a Kipling
contemporary, physicist Albert Einstein (1879-1955),
wrote four path-breaking
papers. One of them revealed his special theory of relativity . In it, he disclosed that electromagnetic waves,
including light, always travel at a constant speed --
about 186,000 miles per second -- but that our
observation of them depends on our movement relative to
their source.
Got that?
Your Editor confesses a sensation of doubt. Big
time.
But I feel more confident that our current
subject -- the efficiency vel non of federal
courts -- depends ever so much on the judiciary's perception of case velocity relative to some
reference point. Huh.
Consider that federal judges hold Vast Power.
They display a great deal of Independence. And,
with few exceptions, they enjoy Near Invisibility
outside the courtroom.
All of which leaves Their Honors with tremendous
discretionary influence over their dockets. They
can move the cases or not move them, push them fast or
slow them down, work them hard or hardly at all.
Your Editor hypothesizes that how quickly judges
choose to dispatch their dockets depends on whether they
look at cases as moving towards trial too fast, too
slow, or at just the right speed.
Next time, I'll attempt an approximation of which
view predominates in 2008 -- and, more important
perhaps, why. |
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top |
ALI Tables Vote on
Aggregate Settlement Rules.

The ALI held its annual
meeting in our nation's capital this year.
Remember that 1L who talked in class all the
time? The one whose hand shot up even if the prof
hadn't asked a question? The gunner who made you
wish Socrates kept his method to himself?
Every law school section had an individual like
that. If you ever wondered where they all went,
speculate no more. They joined the American
Law Institute. And they have gathered
at The Mayflower -- the sometime home-away-from-home of
a law classmate, Eliot Spitzer, and until Wednesday the
temporary headquarters of law geekdom.
(Note the they.)
The session on May 19 devoted several hours
to chapters 1 and 3 in Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation, Tentative Draft No. 1 (Apr.
7, 2008). Members aimed comments,
criticisms, and a few barbs at the Reporter and
Associate Reporters, who handled them in good
cheer. The discussion produced several revisions
and clarifications. It also resulted -- with a big
exception -- in consensus approval of both chapters.
The sections dealing with aggregate settlements --
3.17, 3.18, and 3.19 -- failed to gain general
acceptance. At the suggestion of ALI's Director,
Lance Liebman, they didn't go up for a vote. The
reporters will instead revisit the provisions and
present them again at the next annual meeting in
2009.
Sections 3.17-3.19 would make a major change to what
people call the "aggregate settlement rule". The
ASR in general invalidates an agreement by multiple
clients to abide by a majority vote on accepting an
aggregate settlement. Section 3.17(b)-(d) would
reverse the ASR, allowing enforcement of such agreements
if the joint clients knowingly consent, in writing, to
an approval mechanism by a "substantial majority" of the
clients.
The consensus broke down over concern that the new
rule would cede undue authority to mass tort
lawyers. Some commenters suggested support for the
rule in the context of business litigants but worried
that many personal injury claimants lack enough
information and sophistication to give effective consent
at the time of hiring counsel. A third group
supported the rule as an improvement over the ASR, which
now impels plaintiffs' lawyers to abandon representation
of clients who refuse to take their share of an
aggregate settlement (think fen-phen and Vioxx as
examples).
Your Editor can't predict how the reporters will
navigate the fault lines within the ALI, but two options
look possible if not likely: First, they will
build even more client protections into Sections
3.17-3.19 and, second, they will scale back their
ambitions -- for now -- and deal only with classes of
clients that satisfy a test for sophistication.
The latter strikes me as a prudent incremental
step towards a better regime for handling settlements in
aggregate litigation. If experience proves it
good, the ALI and courts may extend it to other
situations. |
Back to
top |
Banishing Jury Trial --
Update.

Judge
Chamberlain Haller (Fred Gwynne) put the parties
to jury trial in My Cousin Vinny (1992).
In February 2007, Your Editor reported a steep decline in
Texas state court jury trials in civil cases. In
1996, district court juries rendered 2,971 verdicts but
only 1,428 during 2006 -- a drop of 52 percent.
District judges also directed verdicts 253 times in 1996
but 473 times in 2006 -- an increase of 87 percent.
I wondered whether the trend continued after
2006. Let's look at the results.
According to The Texas Office of Court
Administration, juries decided 1,643 district
court cases in 2007, and district judges directed
verdicts in 384. The performance improved the
decline in jury verdicts to less than 45 percent from
1996 and the jump in directed verdicts to below 52
percent.
Will the trends towards more jury trials and fewer
directed verdicts continue in 2008. The statistics
through April 2008 give good news and bad. The 459
jury verdicts in the first four months translate into
1,377 for the full year -- raising the drop-off from
1996 to 53.6 percent -- but the directed verdicts so far
(103) equal 309 for all of 2008 -- a rise of only 22
percent versus 1996.
Note that a fall-off in caseloads cannot account for
the trend. In 1996, pending district court cases
(including criminal matters) totaled a bit more than
700,000. By 2006, the number had grown to more
than 900,000 and in 2007 to about 950,000. We
should have more jury trials now rather than fewer.
The overall results suggest that trial by jury in
civil cases remains under pressure if not in danger of
extinction.
Section 12 of the Texas Constitution provides that
"[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. The Legislature shall pass such laws as
may be needed to regulate the same, and to maintain its
purity and efficiency."
What happened?
Would
That You Could.

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Cartoonbank.com. Used with permission.
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