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Barnett's
Notes
On Commercial
Litigation |
Volume III, Issues 7-8 July-August
2007 | |
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In This Issue
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1. Legal
Mythology. Sing to me of the man,
Muse, the man of twists and turns. Plus
law stuff.
2. Did You
Know? The hourly fee's lethality.
3. Hydraulic Pressure to
Settle. A myth bigger than the
Colossus of
Rhodes.
4. The
Trials of Yesteryear. Why they've
melted away.
5. Roundup.
Favorite Blawgletter
posts.
6. Hot
Lunch. Tort reform now involves neither
torts nor reform.
7 Free Trial
Offer. Cartoon.
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 Solon, the Athenian law-giver,
didn't charge by the hour.
Did You Know?
Law firms once sent bills that stated a
dollar amount plus this: "For services
rendered." Businesses bristled and came to
hope that the hourly fee
would track lawyerly value. But consider:
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Paying by the hour rewards
inefficiency, encourages a take-no-prisoners
approach, and promotes delay in case
resolution.
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Busy judges
generally don't have time, information, or
inclination to force economy on lawyers and
parties.
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Making lawsuits
costly discourages people from bringing them and
may, especially in business litigation, hurt
competition.
The worst effect consists in the fact
that the hourly fee makes strong but small cases
uneconomic. And so the median size of lawsuits
grows ever larger. Increasingly, to achieve
efficiencies, they take the form of aggregate
litigation -- class actions, collective actions, and
mass actions. And, as the stakes rise, procedural
gambits trump the merits, defendants complain about
"hydraulic pressure" to settle (see below
right), trials become rarer (just below),
courts toss jury verdicts, and tort reform (way
down at the bottom) comes to the fore.
Lawyer-author Scott Turow denounces
the billable hourbecause of its corrosive effect on the
profession. His worry may seem quaint; we'll
never go back to the days when firms muddled their way
to profitability.
I rise not to condemn the
hourly fee because it makes lawyers into business people
but because it pushes civil justice out of
reach for most ordinary people, companies and
individuals alike.
The hourly fee may have represented
progress decades ago, but no more. Its usefulness
as a proxy for value has become a myth. We should
retire it, and soon. |
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 Warrior-goddess Athena sprang,
in full armor, from her daddy Zeus's
brow.
The Trials of Yesteryear
In Catch-22
(1961), a novel about the craziness of war, Joseph
Heller's main character obsesses about Snowden, who
dies on a bombing mission. Yossarian
couldn't save Snowden because Snowden's shrapnel
wounds disemboweled him. And the horror haunts
Yossarian.
I found Heller's black humor
irresistible. A captain by the name of Major
Major, for example, received a one-rank promotion --
with hilarious results. But I have in mind a
literary reference that Heller put in Yossarian's
mouth: "Where are the Snowdens of
yesteryear?"
(Heller borrows the line from a 15th century French
poet, Francois Villon, who asked "[w]here are the snows
of yesteryear?")
I inquire: where did the
trials of yesteryear go? My answers may shock
you. So please take your heart medicine before
reading on.
Hourly fees create litigators instead of
trial lawyers. Litigators thrive on
technicalities, a habit that serves them ill
in court and makes them reluctant to go
there.
The increasing median size of cases and
complexity make the average trial riskier for both
sides.
The rise of arbitration as trial
substitute results partly from disrespect for jury
verdicts. In Texas, for example, a 55
percent drop in trials coincided with an 81 percent
increase in overturning verdicts.
So the hourly fee plus
hostility to juries melted the snows/trials of
yesteryear. |
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Hot Lunch
You don't see or hear much about
tort reform
any more. Unless you oppose it. Or if you
think that tort reform should relate, um, to
torts.
Let me say first that the folks who
still seek reform of tort law have moved on. Now
they want to shut down the "litigaton lottery" and
end "jackpot justice". They have ceded the debate
about "reform" to the againsters, who apparently enjoy
whipping a dead horse.
I imagine that the change in terminology
reflects most people's ambivalence about civil justice
-- and good polling. Even SpongeBob Square
Pants features a spurious
personal injury lawsuit (by Plankton
against Mr. Krabs)
for a slip-and-fall in the Krusty
Krab restaurant. (Episode 62). The piscatorial jury seems sympathetic
to Plankton at first. But the episode ends in a
defense verdict after Sponge Bob
shows that Plankton cooked up the lawsuit to
get the secret formula for Krabby
Patties. The result renews
faith in Bikini Bottom civil justice and in juries
everywhere.
But tort reform
goes way beyond torts. Now it
seeks across-the-board changes to weaken contracts,
antitrust and consumer protection laws, and intellectual
property. It aims to limit rights
to hire lawyers on a contingent fee basis, to pile on
procedural barriers to trial on the merits, and to take
more cases out of the hands of juries. If you
don't believe me, go here and
here and see for your own self.
The ancient Greeks created trial by
jury, and their goddess Eunomia
symbolized respect for law. Would she
support tort reform today? Nosir.
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Legal Mythology
 The Temple of Poseidon at Cape Sounion, Greece. King Aegeus
leapt to his death from the cliffs here after he
spotted the boat of his son Theseus,
who forgot to switch from black to white
sails to signal his safe return from
battling the Minotaur on Crete.
Your Editor spent a couple of weeks this summer
beating around Greece and Italy. The tour -- with
"Gods and Heroes" in its name -- included lectures by a
Yale dean and a Harvard Ph.D.
Plus site tours in wonderful places like Athens, Mycenae, Epidaurus, Santorini, Rhodes, Lindos, the
Palace at Knossos, Delphi, Taoromina, and Pompeii. What fun!
Talk of mythology of course dominated. How did
the wine-dark Aegean Sea get its name? (The
grieving -- blue, get it? -- Attican King Aegeus fatally plunged
into it.) Who lived in the Strait of Messina? (Scylla and Charybdis)
What made the oracle at Delphi talk
jibberish? (Gas inhalation.) Why do I get to
ask all the questions? (Because.)
Our odyssey provides the
back-drop for this first-ever double issue of
Barnett's Notes. Why? What
possible interest might you have in my
vacation?
Well, for one thing, it led me to skip
an issue. But, more important, it slapped an
epiphany upside my head -- that myths evolved from
a process familiar to trial lawyers. People
made stuff up. Out of whole cloth.
Totally. I kid you not.
Take Theseus. The founder-king
of Athens started out as a guy who basically did one
thing. He slayed the Minotaur, a half-bull
half-human monster who dwelt in the center of
a maze at Knossos on Crete. (Don't ask about
his parentage; you don't want to know.) But
Athenians wanted a more impressive mythological
representative. And so they embroidered on his
history.
So much so that Theseus's life started paralleling
that of Herakles, he of the legendary
12 labors. For example: Herakles
descended from a man (Amphitryon) and a god (Zeus)
but only one woman (Alkmene); likewise with Theseus (the
blue-sea Aegeus and Poseidon both
impregnated Aethra). Herakles killed the Nemean
lion; Theseus destroyed the Crommyonian sow.
Herakles captured the Cretan bull; Theseus caught the
bull of Marathon. And so on.
The Romans did the same sort of thing but with
less originality. They adopted Zeus as
Jupiter, Hera as Juno, Poseidon as Neptune, and
Aphrodite as Venus, to name a few. They also
created some new deathless ones, such as two-face
Janus, the god of doors and of beginnings and
endings.
The tradition of making stuff up continues to this
day. Judges tolerate it so long as it . . . well,
it doesn't really have sharp edges. One person's
mythology -- his junk science, say -- counts as
another's verifiable truth -- her cutting-edge
biological theory. Plus story-telling holds a high
place in the tradition of courtroom persuasion.
Your Editor will not wade into the rip-tides of
controversy. Nay. We love our clients on
both sides of the versus far too
much. But let us, you and I, explore a few current
issues that deserve our attention: the hourly fee,
hydraulic settlement pressure, vanishing trials, and
tort reform. I will attempt to dispel myths that
have grown up around them.
And I hope you enjoy the journey as much as I did
mine.
Barry Barnett, Editor
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Hydraulic Pressure to
Settle
 Hydraulic pressure, escaping.
Just after the dawn of the 20th century, a
dissenting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
famously said that "great cases, like hard cases,
make bad law". He explained that a case's
greatness will "exert a kind of hydraulic pressure
which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and
before which even well settled principles of law will
bend." Northern Securities Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904).
What Did Holmes Mean?
He meant, I suspect, that judges -- even his
colleagues on the U.S. Supreme Court -- cannot
isolate themselves from forces at work
in the communities where they live. But,
implying his own insensibility to public
irrationality, Justice Holmes opined that the Sherman
Act did not prohibit an agreement among several
railroads not to compete with each other. The hue
and cry, the great Holmes suggested,
impelled one set of lesser mortals (government
lawyers) to seek an injunction against the
monopoly and another group (the 5-4 majority) to
uphold a judgment granting it.
History disagreed with Holmes on the merits, but do
let us ponder his analogy. The power of
hydraulic pressure allows a small force at
point A to exert a larger force at point B within a
mechanical system. It thus pushes a big
piston to raise the car rack so that a mechanic can
fix the oil pan you busted when you drove too fast
over a road hump. But in Northern
Securities Holmes used "a kind of hydraulic
pressure" as a figure for distortion of judgment.
Inordinate Pressure to
Settle
Which brings us to the recent rash of lower
court decisions that decry "hydraulic pressure" to
settle class actions. The first reference, in
1995, may have warranted the name. In In re
General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Product
Liability Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 790 (3d Cir.
1995), Circuit Judge Becker noted the
deleterious effect of a certifying a sprawling
class action for settlement:
Cases could be filed without any expectation or
intention of litigation, with the foreknowledge that
the natural hydraulic pressure for settlement may in
fact lead to a class settlement, especially given the
incentive a defendant has to bind as many potential
claimants as possible with an approved class
settlement.
The plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers would
get fat fees, and the defendants would buy peace
cheap. The pressure to certify -- on the
parties and the trial court -- may have distorted
judgment about the propriety of certification,
with the potential that absent plaintiffs would get
short shrift.
Later use of "hydraulic pressure" stands
Judge Becker's concerns on their
head. These instances don't focus on
judgment-distorting pressure to certify but
on pressure to settle, inferring that
certification impels defendants to pay big
money to resolve unmeritorious claims.
E.g., Hevesi v. Citigroup, Inc., 366 F.3d 70,
81 (2d Cir. 2004) (granting Rule 23(f) petition in part
because, due to settlement pressure, "it is hard to
conceive of many cases that are less likely than the
instant case to yield an appealable final judgment");
De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301,
311 (3d Cir. 2003) ("The aggregation of claims,
particularly as class actions, profoundly affects the
substantive rights of the parties to the
litigation.") (emphasis added); In re Visa
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124,
148 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Even a defendant who is innocent
and holy may rationally choose to pay a few hundred
million dollars in settlement of a class action rather
than 'run the risk of ruinous
liability.'") (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory
committee's note); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 164 (3d
Cir. 2001) (citing "inordinate or hydraulic pressure on
defendants to settle, avoiding the risk, however small,
of potentially ruinous liability" as factor favoring
interlocutory review).
The slope has proved slippery. In Regents
of the Univ. of Calif. v. Credit Suisse First Boston
(USA) Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 379 (5th
Cir. 2007), the majority cited "particularly acute"
pressure to settle as justification for Rule 23(f)
review. But the court went on to reverse
certification because it rejected the merits of the
class claims. The majority even cited its
concern about "opening the floodgates for nearly
unlimited and frequently unpredictable liability" as
support for its ruling that the claims couldn't survive
legal scrutiny. Id . at 393.
"Pressure to settle" thus merged with an
explicit weighing of the merits.
Observations
I have two observations on this perhaps
inevitable consequence of allowing
practically limitless interlocutory review of class
certification decisions. The first concerns the
absence of proof that settlement pressure
encourages wrong certifications, either generally
or in particular cases. One would expect, in fact,
that the very size of a case would promote greater care
in district courts' rulings under Rule 23. See
Regents, 482 F.3d at 380 (noting the
district court's "best of intentions" and "hurculean
effort").
The second thought also comes from lack of
evidence. Courts appear to indulge an irrebuttable
presumption that pressure to settle
produces unjust outcomes. On what basis do
they do that? As far as I can tell, they take it
as an article of faith. They don't cite
studies. They don't
even offer examples. Do defendants
actually misjudge the risk of class actions?
Do they truly overpay? Count me skeptical.
The strongest cases get the most urgent
cries of hydraulic pressure. One can hardly blame
the defendants, but judges needn't accept their
complaints at face value. The focus
should stay on evaluating the likelihood of
error by the district court. A settlement
class may increase the danger of a
mistake. But mere bigness normally
doesn't -- and it usually has the opposite effect.
Justice Holmes, in his very first dissent, sassed his
Northern Securities colleagues by implying that
they let public opinion bend their judgment. He
was wrong; they were right. And, in the spirit of
humility, which becomes us all, let us settle or
try cases on their merits. Let us allow
doubt about settlement pressure in weak
cases. Cost of defense, perhaps. Maybe
a tiny bit more for the low but conceivable
possibility of losing not only at trial but also on
post-trial motions and appeal. But please
don't pay more than that, friends, for bad cases.
You'll have only believing in a myth to
blame. |
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Barry Barnett, Editor 901
Main Street, Suite 5100 Dallas, Texas 75202 Phone:
214-754-1903
Copyright © 2007 SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P Attorneys
at Law. All rights reserved.
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